Adding Recess Appointments to the President's "Tool Chest" of Unilateral Powers

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: ryan.owens{at}wustl.edu.

	Abstract

In the struggle to control the federal bureaucracy, presidents have an overlooked but powerful tool: the recess appointment. By making recess appointments, presidents can fill vacancies without the advice and consent of the Senate. The authors delineate three conditions that define presidential unilateral powers and demonstrate how recess appointments fit within that paradigm. Presidents, the authors argue, should be more likely to make recess appointments to important policy-making positions, namely, major independent agencies. The authors compile a data set of every civilian nomination and recess appointment between 1987 and 2004. After controlling for other factors, the authors find strong support for their theory.

First published on October 6, 2007, doi:10.1177/1065912907307541

Political Research Quarterly 2007;60:645.

A more recent version of this article appeared on December 1, 2007


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