Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

For more information, click here

Become a Reviewer!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Political Research Quarterly
This Article
Right arrow Abstract Freely available
Right arrow Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Diermeier, D.
Right arrow Articles by Kern, M. C.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

The Micro-Dynamics of Coalition Formation

Daniel Diermeier

Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois

Roderick I. Swaab

Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois

Victoria Husted Medvec

Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois

Mary C. Kern

Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, New York

We present an experimental approach to study the micro-dynamics of coalition formation in an unrestricted bargaining environment. Specifically, we investigate a fundamental feature of sequential coalition bargaining models: expectations about future bargaining behavior will influence current bargaining outcomes. To do so, we test the hypothesis that coalition bargaining may lead to inefficient outcomes as agents are unable to effectively commit to preliminary agreements during the bargaining process. We conjecture that communication plays an important role in establishing such commitments. We then experimentally manipulate the communication channels and show that restrictions undermine trust and lead to decreased efficiency.

Key Words: coalitions • dynamics • coalition formation • experiments

References

  • Arkes, H.R., L.T. Herren, and A.M. Isen. 2000. The role of potential loss in the influence of affect on risk-taking behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 42:191-93.
  • Arunachalam, V., and W.N. Dilla. 1992. Computer-mediated communication and structured interaction in transfer pricing negotiation. Journal of Information Systems 6:149-70.
  • Aumann, R. 1976. Agreeing to disagree. Annals of Statistics 4:1236-39.[CrossRef][Web of Science][Medline] [Order article via Infotrieve]
  • Aumann, R. 1995. Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality. Games and Economic Behavior 8:6-19.[CrossRef][Web of Science][Medline] [Order article via Infotrieve]
  • Axelrod, R. 1970. Conflict of interest. Chicago: Markham.
  • Baltes, B.B., M. Dickson, M.P. Sherman, C.C. Bauer, and J.S. LaGanke. 2002. Computer-mediated communication and group decision making: A meta-analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 87 (1): 156-79.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Baron, D.P. 1989. A Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions. American Journal of Political Science 33:1048-84.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Baron, D. 1993. Government Formation and Endogenous Parties. American Political Science Review 87: 34-47.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Baron, D.P., and D. Diermeier. 2001. Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems. Quarterly Journal of Economics August: 933-67.
  • Baron, D.P., D. Diermeier, and P. Fong. 2007. Policy dynamics and inefficiency in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation. Research Paper 1960, Stanford University Graduate School of Business.
  • Baron, D.P., and J.A. Ferejohn. 1989. Bargaining in legislatures. The American Political Science Review 83 (4): 1181-1206.[CrossRef]
  • Baron, J. 1995. Blind justice: Fairness to groups and the do-no-harm principle. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 8:71-83.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Carlson, J.R., and R.W. Zmud. 1999. Channel expansion theory and the experiential nature of media richness perceptions. Academy of Management Journal 42 (2): 153-70.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Carnevale, P.J., D.J. Pruitt, and S. Seilheimer. 1981. Looking and competing: Accountability and visual access in integrative bargaining. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40:111-20.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Croson, R.T. 1999. Look at me when you say that: An electronic negotiation simulation. Simulation and Gaming 30:23-37.[CrossRef]
  • Daft, R.L., and R. Lengel. 1986. Organizational information requirements, media richness and structural design. Management Science 32:554-71.[Web of Science]
  • Derthick, M.A. 2002. Up in smoke: From legislation to litigation in tobacco politics. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
  • Diermeier, D. 2006. Coalition government. In Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, ed. B. Weingast and D. Wittman. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Diermeier, D. and S. Gailmard. 2006. Self-Interest, Inequality, and Entitlement in Majoritarian Decision-Making. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1(4): 327-350.[CrossRef]
  • Diermeier, D., and A. Merlo. 2000. Government turnover in parliamentary democracies. Journal of Economic Theory 94:46-79.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Diermeier, D., H. Eraslan, and A. Merlo. 2003. A structural model of government formation. Econometrica 71 (1): 27-70.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Diermeier, D., and R.B. Myerson. 1994. Bargaining, Veto Power, and Legislative Committees. CMSEMS working paper No. 1089. Northwestern University.
  • Diermeier, D., and R.B. Myerson. 1999. Bicameralism and its consequences for the internal organization of legislatures. American Economic Review 89 (5): 1182-96.[Web of Science]
  • Eraslan, H., and A. Merlo. 2002. Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory 10:31-48.
  • Frechette, G., J.H. Kagel, and M. Morelli. 2005. Behavioral identification in coalition bargaining: An experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers. Econometrica 73 (6): 1893-1937.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Fulk, J. 1993. Social construction of communication technology. Academy of Management Journal 36 (5): 921-50.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Kahai, S.S., and R.B. Cooper. 1999. The effect of computer-mediated communication on agreement and acceptance. Journal of Management Information Systems 16 (1): 165-88.
  • Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of choice under risk. Econometrica 47 (2): 263-91.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Kiesler, S., J. Siegel, and T.W. McGuire. 1984. Social psychological aspects of computer-mediated communication. American Psychologist 39:1123-34.[CrossRef]
  • King, D.C., and J.C. Glidewell. 1980. Dyadic bargaining outcomes under individualistic and competitive orientations. Human Relations 33 (11): 781-803.[Abstract]
  • Laver, M., and N. Schofield. 1990. Multi-party government: The politics of coalition in Europe. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
  • Lewis, S., and W. Fry. 1977. Effects of visual access and orientation on discovery of integrative bargaining. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 20 (1): 75-92.[Medline] [Order article via Infotrieve]
  • Lim, L.H., and I. Benbasat. 1993. A theoretical perspective of negotiation support systems. Journal of Management Information Systems 9 (3): 27-44.
  • Loyd, D.L., M.C. Kern, and L. Thompson. 2005. Classroom research: Bridging the ivory divide. Academy of Management Learning & Education 4 (1): 8-21.[Web of Science]
  • Madigan, D. 1996. Social Services. Evanstan, IL: Kellogg Dispute Resolution Research Center, Northwestern University.
  • Mannix, E.A. 1994. Will we meet again? The effects of power, distribution norms, and the scope of future interaction in small group negotiation. International Journal of Conflict Management 5:343-68.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Mennecke, B.E., J.S. Valacich, and B.C. Wheeler. 2000. The effects of media and task on user performance: A test of the task-media fit hypothesis. Group Decision and Negotiation 9 (6): 507-29.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Morelli, M. 1999. Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining, American Political Science Review 93(4): 809-820.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Morley, I.E., and G.M. Stephenson. 1969. Interpersonal and interparty exchange, a laboratory simulation of a negotiation at the plant level. British Journal of Psychology 60: 543-45.[Web of Science]
  • ---. 1970. Formality in experimental negotiations: A validation study. British Journal of Psychology 61 (3): 383-84.[Web of Science]
  • Morris, M., J. Nadler, T. Kurtzberg, and L. Thompson. 2002. Schmooze or lose: Social friction and lubrication in e-mail negotiations. Group Dynamics 6 (1): 89-100.[CrossRef]
  • Morris, S., and H.S. Shin. 2003. Global Games: Theory and Applications. In Advances in Economics and Econometrics (Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society ), eds. M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S. Turnovsky. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
  • Naquin, C.E., and G.D. Paulson. 2003. Online bargaining and interpersonal trust. Journal of Applied Psychology 88 (1): 113-20.[CrossRef][Web of Science][Medline] [Order article via Infotrieve]
  • Overly, M.R. 1999. E-policy. New York: Amacom.
  • Pertschuk, M. 2001. Smoke in their eyes: Lessons in movement leadership from the tobacco wars. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
  • Poole, M.S., D.L. Shannon, and G. DeSanctis. 1992. Communication media and negotiation processes. In Communication and negotiation, ed. L. L. Putnam and M. E. Roloff. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
  • Purdy, J.M., and P. Nye. 2000. The impact of communication media on negotiation outcomes. International Journal of Conflict Management 11 (2): 162-87.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Rangaswamy, A., and G. Shell. 1997. Using computers to realize joint gains in negotiations: Toward an "electronic bargaining table." Management Science 43 (8): 1147-63.[Web of Science]
  • Rubinstein, A. 1982. The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under almost common knowledge. American Economic Review 79:385-91.
  • Rutter, D. 1987. Communication by telephone. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon.
  • Short, J.A. 1974. The effect of medium communication on experimental negotiation. Human Relations 27:225-34.[Abstract]
  • Short, J.A., E. Williams, and B. Christie. 1976. The social psychology of telecommunications. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
  • Suh, K.S. 1999. Impact of communication medium on task performance and satisfaction: An examination of media-richness theory. Information & Management 35:295-312.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Swaab, R., M. Kern, D. Diermier, and V. Medvec. In press. Who says what to whom? Effects of communicator- and content awareness on coalition formation. Social Cognition.
  • Swaab, R.I., V. Medvec, and D. Diermeier. n.d. Communication media and negotiations: Meta-analyses on processes and outcomes. Under review.
  • Swaab, R.I., T. Postmes, P. Neijens, M.H. Kiers, and A.C.M. Dumay. 2002. Multi-party negotiation support: The role of visualization's influence on the development of shared mental models. Journal of Management Information Systems 19 (1): 129-50.
  • Swaab, R.I., T. Postmes, and R. Spears. In press. Identity formation in multiparty negotiation. British Journal of Social Psychology.
  • Valley, K.L., J. Moag, and M. Bazerman. 1998. "A matter of trust": Effects of communication on the efficiency and distribution of outcomes. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 34:211-38.[CrossRef][Web of Science]
  • Walther, J. 1996. Computer-mediated communication: Impersonal, interpersonal, and hyperpersonal interaction. Communication Research 23:3-43.[Abstract]
  • Wichman, H. 1970. Effects of isolation and communication on cooperation in a 2-person game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 16 (1): 114.[CrossRef][Web of Science]

This version was published on September 1, 2008

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 3, 484-501 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/1065912908316981
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Political Research QuarterlyHome page
M. Laver
Governmental Politics and the Dynamics of Multiparty Competition
Political Research Quarterly, September 1, 2008; 61(3): 532 - 536.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 Political Research QuarterlyHome page
K. Strom
Communication and the Life Cycle of Parliamentary Democracy
Political Research Quarterly, September 1, 2008; 61(3): 537 - 542.
[PDF]

This Article
Right arrow Abstract Freely available
Right arrow Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Diermeier, D.
Right arrow Articles by Kern, M. C.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?