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Dynamic Approaches to Studying Parliamentary Coalitions

Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois

References

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Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 3, 479-483 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/1065912908321745


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This Article Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Druckman, J. N. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?