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Just How Pluralist Is Direct Democracy? The Structure of Interest Group Participation in Ballot Proposition Elections

University of California, Riverside

Robert Hanneman

University of California, Riverside

In this article we look at the pattern of interest group engagement in direct democracy elections. Using a social network analysis of campaign contributions we examine whether or not patterns of group conflict conform to a stable split along a single (left/right) dimension. While we find that it is the case that there are stable components to group participation in direct democracy elections and that group alliances do lie along a left/right dimension we also find this characterization to be a simplification of actual patterns of engagement. Not only is there evidence of single-issue engagement, there is also evidence of a second—insider/outsider—dimension to direct democracy politics.

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This Article Abstract Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Bowler, S. Articles by Hanneman, R. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                   What's this?