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National Missile Defense and Deterrence

University of Missouri

The current stance of the Bush administration has renewed debate on the implications of national missile defense. While a large part of that debate concerns its technical and economic feasibility, there is also considerable debate concerning the ramifications of national missile defense for international peace and stability. Unfortunately, few studies have analyzed the implications of missile defense through the lens of deterrence theory. Those that have were based on classical deterrence theory, which is plagued by a variety of logical inconsistencies and empirical anomalies. Accordingly, I examine the implications of national missile defense for deterrence from the vantage point of an alternative theory of deterrence, perfect deterrence theory. The results indicate that national missile defense generally enhances the stability of deterrence; the greatest threat missile defense poses is causing dissatisfaction in potential challengers.

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This Article Abstract Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Quackenbush, S. L. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                   What's this?