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Evolution in State Governance Structures: Unintended Consequences of State Tax and Expenditure Limitations

University of California, Riverside

Todd Donovan

Western Washington University

How did state governments respond to constraints imposed by tax and expenditure limitations? We argue that the states’ experiences with TELs help us understand an evolutionary dimension to political institutions and institutional change. We test if TEL states created new local governments in response to constraints TELs placed on state budgeting. Other studies show that states shifted their revenue and expenditure mixes in response to TELs. We demonstrate that they also shifted their jurisdictional mix of governance. We find that TEL states were more likely to create new local governments after the "tax revolt" of the 1980s. However, this effect depends on where TELs were introduced. They had greater effects on generating new governments in states where ballot initiatives were easier to use.

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Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 2, 189-196 (2004)
DOI: 10.1177/106591290405700201


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This Article Abstract Full Text (PDF) Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Bowler, S. Articles by Donovan, T. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                   What's this?