This Article Free Full Text (Free PDF) Free All Versions of this Article: 1065912908317028v1 61/4/636    most recent References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Similar articles in Web of Science Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Barnes, J. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Courts and the Puzzle of Institutional Stability and Change

Administrative Drift and Judicial Innovation in the Case of Asbestos

University of Southern California, Los Angeles, barnesj{at}usc.edu

The institutional development literature has begun to move beyond the concept of punctuated equilibrium and consider how the forces of stability and change interact. A central theme involves drift—the shifting of the effect of stable institutions through changing circumstances. This article uses the case of asbestos injury compensation to highlight how the very features of American government that make drift likely also promise to displace it, as courts step in when Congress fails to act. The broader implication is that drift is best understood as a transitional stage of development, not a dominant mode of change, in fragmented policy-making systems with multiple access points.

Key Words: institutional change • American political development • court—Congress relations

This version was published on December 1, 2008

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 4, 636-648 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/1065912908317028


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?