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The Kennedy Experiment Revisited

George Washington University

Many of the critical issues and conflicts in international relations today bear a significant resemblance to the geopolitical circumstances that led to the development of a theorem the author published in these pages forty years ago. This theorem points toward a course of (1) unilateral, (2) reciprocal, and (3) symbolic actions between mutually mistrustful agents as the best road to travel toward the possibility of "normal" negotiations. Looking back at the events of 1962—1963, the author finds (as he found in his article forty years ago) that the unilateral-reciprocal approach led to reduced tensions between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Although his theorem has received the kind of varied and relevant observations those who formulate theorems aspire to, the author regrets that there have been very few attempts to apply this theorem to subsequent international conflicts as a tension-reducing tactic.

Key Words: international cooperation • political psychology • conflict resolution • nonstate actors

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 61, No. 1, 20-24 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/1065912907311702


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