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Adding Recess Appointments to the President's "Tool Chest" of Unilateral PowersWashington University, Saint Louis, Missouri
Washington University, Saint Louis, Missouri
Washington University, Saint Louis, Missouri
University of Kansas, Lawrence In the struggle to control the federal bureaucracy, presidents have an overlooked but powerful tool: the recess appointment. By making recess appointments, presidents can fill vacancies without the advice and consent of the Senate. The authors delineate three conditions that define presidential unilateral powers and demonstrate how recess appointments fit within that paradigm. Presidents, the authors argue, should be more likely to make recess appointments to important policy-making positions, namely, major independent agencies. The authors compile a data set of every civilian nomination and recess appointment between 1987 and 2004. After controlling for other factors, the authors find strong support for their theory.
Key Words: recess appointments • presidential powers • Congress-presidential relations • unilateral presidency • separation of powers
This version was published on December
1, 2007 Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 4,
645-654 (2007) This article has been cited by other articles:
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