This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Gang Guo Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Retrospective Economic Accountability under Authoritarianism

Evidence from China

University of Mississippi, University

The relationship between the turnover of government leaders and economic performance has rarely been studied in authoritarian regimes. In mainland China the reforms of the past quarter century have increased the economic accountability of local leaders. At the same time, there is some evidence that informal and idiosyncratic factors are more likely to operate at lower levels of government. An analysis of a comprehensive panel data set shows that Chinese county leaders are frequently replaced and that revenue growth increases the probability of promotion of county chief executives. Newly installed or minority nationality chief executives are less likely to be replaced.

Key Words: government turnover • economic performance • responsibility hypothesis • county leaders • China

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 3, 378-390 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/1065912907304501


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?