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When Do Economic Sanctions Work?

Asymmetric Perceptions, Issue Salience, and Outcomes

Dursun Peksen

University of Missouri–Columbia

In this article, the authors examine perceptions of the salience of the issue under dispute by both sender and target states and their impact on sanction outcomes. They find that both the sender's perception of the salience of the issue and the asymmetry in perception of issue salience between sender and target favoring sender states have significant and dramatic effects on sanctions outcomes. This finding suggests that how states perceive the issue(s) at dispute matters in determining the likelihood of sanctions success and adds to our understanding of what determines sanctions outcomes.

Key Words: economic sanctions • sanctions outcomes • issue salience • asymmetric issue perception

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 1, 135-145 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/1065912906298632


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