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Position-Taking and Electoral Accountability in the U.S. House of Representatives

Bovitz Research Group, California

Jamie L. Carson

The University of Georgia

While past research has offered some initial evidence linking patterns of position-taking behavior with incumbents’ electoral fortunes, we are left without a comprehensive study that informs us whether individual roll-call votes can be electorally consequential and lends insight into the conditions under which position-taking on roll calls may yield electoral implications. This article takes a step toward filling that void by examining the electoral implications of hundreds of House roll calls since the early 1970s. We find that, after controlling for the usual factors, a wide range of individual roll-call decisions have significant effects on incumbents’ electoral margins. We also find that the extent to which a particular roll call is controversial, salient, and a catalyst for intra-party disagreement affects whether it has electoral implications. In sum, our analysis addresses longstanding questions regarding how and when legislators are rewarded or punished at the polls for their behavior in Congress.

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 59, No. 2, 297-312 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/106591290605900211


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