Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

CiteULike is a free service for managing and discovering scholarly references - click here to get started.

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Political Research Quarterly
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Biglaiser, G.
Right arrow Articles by Brown, D. S.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

Notes

The Determinants of Economic Liberalization in Latin America

Glen Biglaiser

Texas Tech University

David S. Brown

University of Colorado

Previous work on political institutions and economic reform provides a number of testable hypotheses that are rarely examined in a multivariate framework. Divided government, political polarization, fragmented legislatures, ideology, external factors, the strength of the presidency, and democracy itself have all been forwarded as possible constraints that influence the depth and speed of economic reform. Using time-series cross-sectional data, this research note provides a multivariate test of the impact these institutions have on different components of structural reform. Our findings suggest that specific institutional arrangements are important for achieving some specific kinds of economic reform. However, our main finding implies the kind of institutional and ideological constraints prominent in the literature do not constrain politicians from enacting reform.

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 4, 671-680 (2005)
DOI: 10.1177/106591290505800414
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 J Law Econ OrganHome page
B. F. Crisp, S. W. Desposato, and K. Kanthak
Legislative Pivots, Presidential Powers, and Policy Stability
J. Law Econ. Organ., June 26, 2009; (2009) ewp016v1.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]