This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Citation Map Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Massie, T. D. Articles by Songer, D. R. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                   What's this?

The Timing of Presidential Nominations to the Lower Federal Courts

University of South Carolina

Thomas G. Hansford

University of South Carolina

Donald R. Songer

University of South Carolina

Presidents often move quite slowly to exercise their important power of judicial appointment. This study attempts to explain these delays by developing a strategic conception of the timing of presidential nominations to the lower federal courts. We argue that the judicial selection process may be best conceptualized by viewing presidents as strategic actors who prefer to select judges with policy preferences that are as close as possible to those of the president, given senatorial and temporal constraints. We test our argument by estimating a duration model of the length of time between vacancy and nomination for all vacancies in the U.S. District Courts and U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1977 to 1999. Our results indicate that the timing of presidential nominations is a function of both politics and institutional constraint.

CiteULike    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				L. M. Holmes Presidential Strategy in the Judicial Appointment Process: "Going Public" in Support of Nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals American Politics Research, September 1, 2007; 35(5): 567 - 594. [Abstract] [PDF]