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Friends Don’t Let Friends Vote for Free Trade: The Dynamics of the Labor PAC Punishment Strategy over PNTR

Bowling Green State University

Steven T. Engel

Georgia Southern University

Studies of PAC contribution strategies tend to focus on the ways in which PACs seek to buy access to legislators or elect candidates friendly to their interests. What do PACs do when those to whom they have given large sums of money vote against their interest on a key piece of legislation? We examine whether labor PACs followed a strategy of punishment in order to send a message to Democrats who supported the passage of Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China (PNTR) in May 2000. We find that labor PACs punished pro-PNTR Democrats in a measured fashion indicating a deterrent form of punishment. A harsher form of punishment strategy was followed in an attempt to incapacitate those pro-PNTR candidates who were most electorally vulnerable. This behavior indicates that contributions are not just inducements to vote favorably or attempts to purchase access.

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 4, 441-448 (2003)
DOI: 10.1177/106591290305600406


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