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Do Governors Matter? Budgeting Rules and the Politics of State Policymaking

Florida State University

Michael Berkman

Pennsylvania State University

Whether and how governors influence public policies in the U.S. is open to question. This research tests a model of gubernatorial influence on public policymaking in which gubernatorial power is conceived of the governor’s power over the budgetary process relative to that of the state legislature. We argue that governors with greater control over the budget process will use those powers to deliver a higher proportion of policies that confer benefits to statewide versus more localized constituencies. As governors’ electoral security increases, their willingness to support legislatively desired localized spending increases. Empirical results derived from pooled cross-sectional models largely support the models tested.

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 4, 409-417 (2003)
DOI: 10.1177/106591290305600403


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