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Separated Powers and Institutional Growth in the Presidential and Congressional Branches: Distinguishing Between Short-Run versus Long-Run Dynamics

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

A central feature of the modern presidential and congressional branches has been its institutional development. Growth in the presidential and legislative branches reflect distinct short-run and long-run dynamics. In the former case, Presidents exhibit greater responsiveness to congressional branch efforts than vice versa. However, in the long run a steadystate equilibrium exists, whereby the Presidency cannot permanently exploit Congress. This proposition is empirically tested by applying a Vector Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) statistical modeling approach to analyze constant dollar-branch expenditure data for the 1939-1997 period. The empirical evidence shows that an "opportunistic Presidency" prevails in the short run; in the long run; however, considerable evidence is obtained in favor of an institutional equilibrium consistent with the "iron law of emulation" thesis. On a more general theoretical level, these findings make the novel point that a critical distinction must be made between short-run and long-run dynamics when assessing institutional relationships involving the Presidency and Congress.

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 1, 27-57 (2002)
DOI: 10.1177/106591290205500102


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