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Political Research Quarterly
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Domestic Politics and the Political Use of Military Force by the United States

James Meernik

University of North Texas

The diversionary hypothesis, that leaders use force to distract publics from suffering economies and declining performance, has been explored in numerous articles and books. Despite this attention, the empirical evidence is often contradictory Some argue there is little evidence of diversionary behavior, while others find significant relationships between domestic politics and U.S. foreign policy behavior. I argue that problems with research design and selection effects account for the contradictory evidence, and that by addressing these issues we can better model the impact of domestic political conditions on presidential decision-making. First, I hypothesize that domestic politics influence the occurrence of international crises. After accounting for this influence, I argue we should find that domestic political conditions do not directly influence presidential decision-making. Second, I hypothesize that we can best model their impact on the decision to use force as a function of the severity of the international crisis to which the President may respond. I find evidence to indicate domestic factor exercise little direct impact on the decision to use force. I found qualified evidence that domestic factors exercise some impact on the decision to use force when the severity of an international crisis is not so great as to demand action and not so insignificant as to guarantee inaction.

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 4, 889-904 (2001)
DOI: 10.1177/106591290105400411


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