Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

For more information, click here

Click here to sign up for SAGE Journal Email Alerts today!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Political Research Quarterly
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Peffley, M.
Right arrow Articles by Hurwitz, J.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

A Multiple Values Model of Political Tolerance

Mark Peffley

University of Kentucky

Pia Knigge

Auburn University-Montgomery

Jon Hurwitz

University of Pittsburgh

While students of political tolerance often view tolerance decisions as a trade-off between opposing values (civil liberties versus other values), there have been few explicit attempts to formulate and test such a multiple-values model. With rare exception, researchers typically examine linkages between tolerance judgments and a single value constellation (civil liberties or general norms of democracy) without examining directly the way people rank competing values. In this essay, we use data from a national telephone survey to test a model of how various value trade-off measures (e.g., value conflict) influence citizens' initial tolerance decisions, as well as their willingness to stick to that judgment in the face of counter-arguments (i.e., the pliability of the initial baseline judgment). We find that while value conflict is often associated with greater political forbearance of disliked groups (e.g., the Klan, flag burners), greater conflict also makes individuals more susceptible to counter-arguments. We also find that when people are presented with roughly equal counterarguments, the tolerant are much more willing to abandon their initial judgment than the intolerant. We conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of our findings for the study of political tolerance and political values.

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 2, 379-406 (2001)
DOI: 10.1177/106591290105400207


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
Political Research QuarterlyHome page
V. A. Baird and D. Javeline
The Persuasive Power of Russian Courts
Political Research Quarterly, September 1, 2007; 60(3): 429 - 442.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Political Research QuarterlyHome page
S. C. Craig, M. D. Martinez, and J. G. Kane
Core Values, Value Conflict, and Citizens' Ambivalence about Gay Rights
Political Research Quarterly, March 1, 2005; 58(1): 5 - 17.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Home page
Political Research QuarterlyHome page
M. Peffley and R. Rohrschneider
Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning
Political Research Quarterly, September 1, 2003; 56(3): 243 - 257.
[Abstract] [PDF]