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U.S. Responses to Defeat in International Courts: A Contingent Model of Rule Compliance

Loyola University, Chicago

I propose, in the present work, to begin the process of developing a testable, generalizable model of foreign policy decision-making that accounts for both domestic and international factors. The framework is designed to illustrate how to combine broad theoretical propositions with contextual, situation-based decisions. It provides an example of how to bridge game-theoretic formulations with case study material in order to develop mid-level causal models. Further, the framework is designed to allow for prediction of a certain range of policies. The model is rooted in a design that invites the researcher to answer a series of yes-or-no questions about the decision-making situation in question. By answering these simple questions, that require relatively little information, we can predict the likely outcome.

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 2, 401-425 (2000)
DOI: 10.1177/106591290005300209


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