Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Become a Reviewer!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Political Research Quarterly
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Lieberman, R. C.
Right arrow Articles by Shaw, G. M.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

Looking Inward, Looking Outward: The Politics of State Welfare Innovation under Devolution

Robert C. Lieberman

Columbia University

Greg M. Shaw

Illinois Wesleyan University

Theories of federalism supporting the devolution of welfare policy to the states suggest that the removal of national policy controls will allow states to tailor-make welfare policy to fit local needs and preferences. These theories predict that state policymaking under devolution will respond mostly to state-specific factors. Alternative theories of federalism suggest that devolution will increasingly expose states to national and interstate pressure, and that state policymaking will follow primarily national factors. We use data on AFDC waivers granted to states from 1977 through the end of the program in 1996 to test these competing approaches. National factors tend to be more important than state-spcific factors in shaping state welfare innovation, supporting competitive theories of federalism, although welfare innovation, unlike benefit levels, does not seem to be susceptible to the "welfare magnet" phenomenon.

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 2, 215-240 (2000)
DOI: 10.1177/106591290005300201
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Urban Affairs ReviewHome page
J. Krinsky
The Urban Politics of Workfare: New York City's Welfare Reforms and the Dimensions of Welfare Policy Making
Urban Affairs Review, July 1, 2007; 42(6): 771 - 798.
[Abstract] [PDF]