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The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

Peter Waterman

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS

One of the most intriguing claims that has been made about the behavior of American presidents is that they have been motivated by deteriorating political conditions at home to engage in conflict abroad. However, we identify three problems with this literature: (1) the use of increments of time rather than international crises as the unit of analysis; (2) the assump tion that presidents can respond to international crises whenever they wish; and (3) the assumption that there are significant political payoffs for diver sionary uses of force. We argue that few if any relationships are likely to be found between presidential popularity, congressional support, economic conditions and elections and the use of force. We test our hypotheses by looking at the political use of military force by American presidents in the post-World War II era (1953-88). We also test to determine if the causal order is not reversed and if it is domestic conditions which precipitate international crises. Ultimately, we find little evidence of any kind of link between domestic political conditions in the United States and uses of force or international crises.

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 3, 573-590 (1996)
DOI: 10.1177/106591299604900306


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