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Congressional and Presidential Effects on the Demand for Lobbying

¹ University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
² University of Memphis
³ Rutgers University
⁴ University of West Georgia

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: frank.r.baumgartner{at}gmail.com.

	Abstract

The authors show that the number of lobbyists active in a given issue area is driven not only by social mobilizations and economic trends but also by government activity.The effect of government spending is smaller than that of congressional interest as reflected in the number of hearings. Much lobbying is in response to regulations, not budgets. The authors augment their analysis by considering indicators of presidential activities. In areas where the president is traditionally active, presidential activity is shown to divert lobbying away from Congress,reducing overall lobbying levels.The authors find strong support for the congressional demand model of lobbying.

First published on August 26, 2009
Political Research Quarterly 2009, doi:10.1177/1065912909343578


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