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Serving Two Masters: Redistricting and Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives

University of Georgia, Athens

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: crespin{at}uga.edu.

	Abstract

This article explores the consequences for representation after a redistricting by reexamining the finding that members of Congress will alter their voting behavior to fit their new district. Specifically, it applies partisan theories of congressional organization to test if members are changing their behavior on all or just some votes. The results indicate that representatives adjust their roll call behavior to fit their new districts on votes that are visible to their constituents. However, when it comes to votes that are important to the party for controlling the agenda (i.e., procedural votes), members do not respond to changes in the district.

First published on June 18, 2009
Political Research Quarterly 2009, doi:10.1177/1065912909338465


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