This Article Full Text (OnlineFirst PDF) Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Taylor, A. J. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Does Presidential Primary and Caucus Order Affect Policy? Evidence from Federal Procurement Spending

North Carolina State University

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: andrew_taylor{at}ncsu.edu.

	Abstract

This article examines the contention that states with early presidential primaries or caucuses receive disproportionate distributive policy benefits. The basic theory is that presidential candidates pledge more federal spending per capita to these states because doing well in their contests is critical to capturing the nomination. Candidates then deliver on these promises if they win the White House. Using by-state procurement per capita data from 1984 to 2004, four conditional hypotheses derived from this thinking are tested. The results show that primary or caucus order matters only during competitive nominations when the ultimately victorious presidential candidate won the state’s contest.

First published on March 20, 2009
Political Research Quarterly 2009, doi:10.1177/1065912908328783


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?