This Article Full Text (OnlineFirst PDF) Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Fang, S. Articles by Ramsay, K. W. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Outside Options and Burden Sharing in Nonbinding Alliances

¹ University of Minnesota
² Princeton University

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: sfang{at}umn.edu.

	Abstract

The authors develop a model of alliances with outside options to study burden sharing in nonbinding alliance agreements. The analysis provides an explanation for the variation in ally contributions to NATO over time and why the post–Cold War period has seen an increase in the use of coalitions of the willing. Additionally, the analysis reveals something of an initiator’s disadvantage in burden sharing—the initiator of an alliance action pays a disproportionate cost of the military burden. The authors’ argument provides an alternative explanation for why the United States has been consistently the largest contributor to NATO.

First published on May 15, 2009
Political Research Quarterly 2009, doi:10.1177/1065912908327528


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?